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The philosopher Mats Rosengren argues that all
knowledge and truths are created by us, and he
sketches another kind of theory of knowledge – a
doxology. Since no truth, evidence or knowledge
exists outside its human context, the rhetoric
based on the good argumentation is central to all
knowledge, according to Rosengren. Rhetoric can
become a tool for scientific inquiries into our
human knowledge. In the same way as rhetoric

where not thought of before, that where
“impossible”, maybe “unacceptable” within the
doxa, before they where given a form and
presented. Here design thinking and new
doxological notions of knowledge can give new
ways of producing knowledge.

INTRODUCTION
In order to understand, grasp and gain knowledge about
the often chaotic world around us several strategies
have been developed by humanity. These have
developed into what we today know as science, art,
philosophy etc., whose objectives in different ways are
to help us settle down in the world and also change it to
the better. New knowledges give new possibilities to
act and influence.
But it is of course no linear process where
understanding comes before acting; direct action,
experimenting and trial of possibilities lead to new
knowledge and experiences. When we confront
concrete problems and situations a lot of different
strategies, ways of thinking and procedures are used
simultaneously to analyze, understand and handle the
problems.
The borders between science, art, humanities,
technology have become strong in spite of the fact that
words like “technique”, “art”, “machine”, “design”
actually are closely connected. These inner connections
have been denied for a long time, and after the
Renaissance the art world was separated from the
world of technology and machines; a branch of the
scientific and quantifiable where put against the
spiritual and qualitative. Vilém Flusser has argued that
it was in the end of the nineteenth century that the word
design started to bridge between the separated domains,
and became a place where art, technology and the
scientific was brought together. (Flusser 2003) Design
is, in the words of Flusser, to deceive nature with
technology, to surpass nature with the artistic, to
construct machines that in an artful way makes us free
artists. Design is to productively fecundate magnificent
ideas from separate fields like science, art, economy,
philosophy with each other.
In contemporary discussions on the relations between
research, design, science and art one can nevertheless
be surprised of how deep the chasms has become
between different fields of knowledge. The big and
urgent question is how we more consciously can
elucidate, raise the status for and systematically make
use of all the knowledge that is produced outside of the
borders that has been drawn around what is considered
“scientific”. And this is a territory in where architecture
and design mostly work. This paper is an attempt to
discuss and bring in some different perspectives on this
question. I argue that design could be used as a way of
producing knowledge, especially if we consider
knowledge as something created by us, and with

rhetorical dimensions. The line of argument draws in the
question of what architectural design knowledge is in
relation to scientific knowledge, involving issues of
different ways and notions of thinking, arguing,
constructing, and forming.

DESIGN, SCIENCE, AND FORM
Erik Stolterman has – in a simplified picture – indicated
that there are two ways or strategies to deal with the
reality we live in. One applies the method of dismantling
to learn how reality functions. The other is assembling
parts to create a changed reality. The first can be seen as
the procedure of science, the second as a design effort.
What Stolterman is emphasising is that the strategies are
used with different purposes – the dismantling is done to
create knowledge of how thing function; the assembling
is done to create something that not yet exists. He argues
that it is a danger both in seeing these activities as
essentially different and in mixing them up to much.
Either do they not communicate with each other at all, or
lose their unique characters and strengths. What is
needed instead is a stronger respect for the distinctive
nature in both traditions, and since science has a strong
tradition while there is a lack of an own intellectual
tradition within design, the latter has to be developed.
(Stolterman 2004)
But the question is if design thinking always is used with
such a different purpose as Stolterman argues. Could not
to assemble just as well be a way of trying to understand
and produce knowledge? To dismantle is certainly a good
way to analyse, to see what factors are involved and to
understand the parts as such, but every explanatory
model, every theory is an assemblage of elements that
can give possibilities to understand relations and
connections, to predict and influence future events.
Jerker Lundequist has argued that the most important
achievements of science is not inventions or discoveries
but the establishment of new theories and concepts.
These concepts and theories are of course constructions,
assemblages and organisations of thought elements.
There are certainly different attitudes to the world one is
striving to understand or shape, but to think variability
and becomings has many times implied problems both
for philosophy and science. Colin Rowe and Fred
Koetter discussed in their famous text “Collage City”
with reference to Claude Levi-Strauss two different
strategies – the methods of science and of bricolage.
Science is described as searching for the truths of
universe while the bricoleur is directed towards a set of
remains that are at hand; one is then dismantling, the
other assembling. (Rowe & Koetter 1999) Rowe &

Koetter urged for the acknowledgment of both science
and bricolage as relevant ways to deal with problems,
and that there are great possibilities if the “civilized”
thinking – full of overestimations of logical sequence –
could be placed on equality with the “savage” thinking
full of analogical leaps. Henri Bergson has written that
to be able to understand and think reality in all its
multiplicity and continuously moving change we have
to install ourselves directly in it. But that is exactly
what the intellect – and science – generally refuses to
do since it is so used to think the mobile through the
immobile. Our intellect is according to Bergson
constituted in a way to primarily create distinct
delimitations and to think change as transitions from
one stably delimited state to next; the world is changing
between relatively stable and immobile forms and
bodies. “But in reality the body is changing form at
every moment; or rather, there is no form, since form is
immobile and the reality is movement. What is real is
the continual change of form: form is only a snapshot
view of transition.” (Bergson 1998) Our perception
manages to freeze the flowing continuity of reality to
incoherent, disconnected images.
To understand and approach the moving reality one has
to reinstate oneself within it. Installed within change
one is able, according to Bergson, to directly grasp both
the change as such and the successive states in which it
could be frozen. But if these successive states is
conceived from the outside as real and not as potential
immobilities, one will never reach the change or
movement as such no matter how small intervals that is
done. Movement, dynamics and change can never be
understood or created from the immobile, static or
eternal. In spite of the many years that has passed since
Bergson and also Rowe & Koetter formulated their
exhortations, they still seem valid, urgent and important
for architecture as well as research.
Form is something that is not only of great concern for
designers, it is very important for science and the
production of knowledge as well. All knowledge is
actually about form; what we can have knowledge
about has a form – or is given form in the production of
knowledge. (Deleuze 1990; Deleuze 1995; Nilsson
2007) Knowledge always relates to forms, to concrete
assemblages or formations of matter, words and signs.
It can be environments in the form of buildings and
things; texts in the form of laws, reports, programs,
norms. Every historical moment, that we live in or are
trying to understand, is a complex formation of things,
discourses, architectures, and social mechanisms. To
produce knowledge is to give form to the specific

problem or situation; a situation that can seem chaotic,
produced by the prevailing diagrammatic power
relations.
Let us return to the strategies to grasp the world that
were delineated in the introduction. Science, art and
philosophy where said to be different ways to approach
reality, and all these are in the eyes of Gilles Deleuze and
Félix Guattari all creating and acting activities. In the
book What is Philosophy? Deleuze & Guattari argue that
philosophy is the discipline for creation of concepts,
which never are given but have to be invented,
fabricated, formed, created. (Deleuze & Guattari 1994)
The book is an attempt to find out what philosophy
actually is or is occupied with, especially in relation to
other activities and ways of thinking that also tries to
bring some order to our often chaotic reality. It is not an
attempt to purify disciplines in order to put up walls
between them, but they are in my view rather trying to
make us see that different disciplines use different ways
of thinking that include different kinds of thought
material, different elements that are assembled in
different ways. These disciplines are continuously in
contact with each other, overlap and inspire to new lines
of thought within the different fields. But a greater
awareness of that you actually are moving between
different forms of thought can give greater consistency to
the actual thought or idea. This is to some extent also in
line with the stronger respect for distinct natures of
disciplines that Stolterman talks about.
Philosophy's exclusive right to create concept does not,
according to Deleuze & Guattari, give it some priority or
privilege since there are other ways of thinking and
creating, other ways of getting ideas, that not have to go
through concepts. Deleuze & Guattari delineate the three
main forms of thought as philosophy, science and art.
What they all have in common is that they always
confront chaos; they put out a plane or throw a net over
chaos but in different ways. Philosophy works with
concepts that are put together in consistent planes;
science works with functions put together on planes of
references or systems; art works with composite
emotions – “blocks of sensations” – on planes of
composition. All these strategies appear, in the view of
Deleuze & Guattari, as most pragmatic and constructing
with an obvious design attitude.
The most important difference between science and
philosophy is their different attitudes to chaos, argue
Deleuze & Guattari. Chaos is rather change, appearance
and disappearance of forms, transitions between different
kinds of orders in an infinitely high speed, than being

just disorder. “Chaos is an infinite speed of birth and
disappearance.” Science approaches chaos by trying to
slow down speeds, freeze changing situations in order
to understand and produce knowledge, which then
attempts to be generally valid, static knowledge. Other
kinds of strategies, in their case philosophy, instead try
to create consistent, coherent thinking but with retained
speed and mobility – primarily within thought, the free,
exploring thought – to be able to create new lines, new
ways to look at, understand and assemble reality. It is a
matter of finding ways to give possibility for
becomings of new assemblages, new understandings
and knowledges about the world, which could be said
to be knowledge of a more dynamic kind in continuous
movement.
We all, as human beings, are always constructing our
tools, models, metaphors, images and notions to help us
handle and predict the changing world around us. By
building more and more knowledge about the material
world, we have also been able to distance us from it; it
has become an object ruled by laws independent from
ourself. But is there any knowledge really independent
of us?

KNOWLEDGE AND RHETORIC
The starting point in a discussion about knowledge and
rhetoric is for the Swedish philosopher Mats Rosengren
the fact that all the knowledge we as human beings
have – from theoretical understandings to practical
attainments – are our human knowledge. By talking
about “our human knowledge”, all dreams about the
stability and ground of knowledge are abandoned.
Rosengren shifts the valuation of the terms in the
classical opposition between doxa – what we believe
about the world and ourselves – and episteme – how
thing really are. Rosengren argues that all knowledge is
doxical and he tries to sketch another kind of theory of
knowledge – a doxology. (Rosengren 2002) A doxology
has to consider both the practical and theoretical
aspects of knowledge, as well as the condition that it is
people with different interests and possibilities that
carries the knowledge, creates the practices and
formulate the theories. The basic thought in this
doxology is that what we traditionally see as
knowledge, truth, and objectively set quantities to
check our human endeavours against, actually are
human – by human beings created – measures. Thereby
these measures are changeable and formable.
(Rosengren 2006)
We have to do a theoretical turn away from the given
epistemological certainty, accept that no clear and

sharp border between true knowledge and pure beliefs
can be drawn, and see the conditioned, assumed and
biased knowledge. Since no truth, evidence or
knowledge exists outside or beyond its human context,
the rhetoric, with its relativistic view of knowledge, is
central to all knowledge, according to Rosengren. The
basis for knowledge is the good arguments and not the
incontestable proofs. What counts is the arguments that
are regarded as good in a specific historical situation, a
particular society, group or scientific discipline.
Rosengren argues that doxology is about situated,
changing and interested knowledge. He argues that
criteria for knowledge not should be “true” or
“objective” in the way of corresponding to a non-human,
objective and neutral reality, but interesting in relation to
the specific knowledge situation.
Rosengren takes the meaning of doxa in his doxology
from the ancient contrast between episteme, knowledge,
and doxa, what you believe is true, opinions. Doxa
delineates the network of convictions, habits, practices,
traditions and models of thought that surround us all.
Doxa is what we hold as true, our beliefs, prejudices,
opinions that are prevailing within a society or group of
people. He argues that the opposition between episteme
and doxa, the difference between knowledge and
opinions is a chimera that is based on a misunderstanding
of the roles and status of opinions in our production of
knowledge.
If we take Protagoras’ statement “man is the measure for
everything” seriously, than it has vast consequences for
what traditionally has been considered truth and
knowledge, Rosengren argues. More than just meaning
that all knowledge and truths are human because it we
that possess them, it means that we never can know
anything in the way Plato and all the Western scientific
thinking strive for. It tells us that every notion of an
objective, neutral, given and uninterested knowledge is
an illusion. But we do not need to abandon concepts like
knowledge, truth, facts, objectivity, we rather have to
understand them as immanent, valid only within the
framework of our human measurements.
When Rosengren talks about rhetoric, and the opinions
that rhetoric takes as a point of departure, it is with the
intention to get away from the Platonic dichotomies and
not to install rhetoric in the place of philosophy. He
argues that rhetoric is a more adequate point of departure
when trying to understand ourselves, our knowledge as
well as creations. Rhetoric does not yield a more true or
better description of reality, but it makes possible an
other, different and, for contemporary problems in

politics and science, more relevant view on truth,
knowledge and value.
Science and philosophy have developed methods to
separate the true from the false, the real from the
illusionary – episteme from doxa. “Rhetoric do not
discover truths, it creates the truths that are needed for
the moment. Or, if you would like, it creates doxa, but
never episteme.” (Rosengren 2006:79)
Rosengren states that we are never discovering or
finding truths, values or facts – we are always creating
them. But this does not mean that we can create
without limitation or just everything. Our acts of
creation are not free, it is limited, but not determined,
predestined or reduceable. Rosengren is deeply
influenced by Cornelius Castoriadis and his notion of
autonomy, meaning that we ourselves create the laws of
the world (auto nomos), they are not given, but all stem
from us. Opposed to autonomy is heteronomy (hetero
nomos – laws coming from outside), and heteronomous
thinking has dominated Western thought in religion,
politics, history and philosophy. Every attempt to base
our human world in something outside of or beyond
this world is a thought of heteronomy. The doxology
that Rosengren is arguing for is a way of trying to think
autonomy, to take away the myths of pure reason and
the neutral objectivity of science. All knowledge, all
facts are interested, meaning that they are always
produced in a specific context as an answer to a
particular strive for knowledge. “We have ourselves
created, and are continuously creating, all our
knowledge, all our politics and our world – so the
question is first and foremost how we create and not if
this creation of ours is corresponding, or not
corresponding, to something ‘out there’.” (Rosengren
2006:21)
A rhetorical theory of knowledge sees all knowledge,
all facts, values and truths as contained within one or
another doxa. It means they can be considered as a
point of departure for an argumentation. If we accept
that truth and facts are based on good arguments, but
never on incontestable proofs, the rhetoric approach
will be as most effective, Rosengren argues. By
emphasising the social character of all knowledge, by
not accepting some scientific or philosophical notion of
objective or uninterested production of knowledge,
then will the rhetorical philosophy, according to
Rosengren, be able to show that even what we have
considered to be epistemic knowledge always has been
doxa.
Doxology sees knowledge as localised and produced in

and through action – the practices that produce and
maintain knowledge is inseparable from knowledge
itself. Rosengren sees rhetoric as a thought-organ, a
organon, that is something that you use to create as well
as act. Rhetoric can become a tool for scientific inquiries
into our human knowledge. (Rosengren 2002) It is done
by shifting the role of rhetoric from showing how to
influence a certain person or audience at a certain
occasion to instead being an instrument to show what
this person or audience believe, value and know in a
specific context and moment.
The way Rosengren describe elements in rhetoric – how
to make an inventory of the topic, arrange and deliver
your arguments based on reason, emotions, confidence
etc – has apparent similarities with central parts of
architectural practice and design activities. In the same
way as Rosengren means that rhetoric can say something
about the doxa and knowledges of the situation, the
architectural project or design proposal could be able to
do so as well – show what is possible to do or imagine,
what values that are prevailing, what conceptions and
knowledges that are accepted, and who has the privilege
of formulating the problem.

RHETORIC AND DESIGN
Rhetoric is of great importance within all architectural
practice, you have to present good arguments for your
proposal and be able to communicate it with a broad
audience. Within architectural competitions the
importance of rhetoric is especially obvious, and
Elisabeth Tostrup has studied this specific field of design
practice. (Tostrup 1999; Tostrup 2007) The winner of an
architectural competition is not the most objective
presentation, but the designer who is able to create a
proposal based on the best arguments. Tostrup states that
the material of the competition expresses the hegemonic
architecture of its time – the network of political,
economic and social relations where some actors have a
dominating position – and the proposals are trying to
communicate its arguments within the field of prevailing
values, thoughts and ideas. The rhetoric of architectural
competitions – and most of all designers’ proposals one
might add – works with a three folded rhetoric, Tostrup
argues; through the physical architecture of the proposal,
through the visual presentation of drawings, images,
models, and through the text material including the
program as well as the description of the proposal. By
studying different competitions she tries to analyse what
is valued as “the best architecture” in the given situation,
what ways of thinking, ideals and prejudices that is
hidden beneath the rhetoric of the designs.

Richard Buchanan has stated that a new conception of
design is needed, a new conception of the discipline as
a humanistic enterprise, recognising the inherently
rhetorical dimension of all design thinking. (Buchanan
1995) The subject matter of design is here important,
where there are tendencies to reduce design to a form
of science which has a fixed or determinate subject
matter that is given to the designer. But the subject
matter of design is not given, it is created through the
activities of invention and planning. There could be
said to be a determinacy in natural science –
discoveries to be made of something constantly
available – and the goal of inquiry is knowledge of
properties and predictability of processes. “There is no
similar determinacy in the activity of designing. The
subject matter is radically indeterminate, open to
alternative resolutions even with the same
methodology.” (Buchanan 1995:24)
There is a specific indeterminateness of design and
design thinking – that the subject matter of design is
indeterminate in relation to other disciplines – since it
is applied to new and changing situations, limited only
by the inventiveness of the designer or team. Then the
most important is not the products as such, but the art
of conceiving and planning products, Buchanan argues.
“In other words, the poetics of products – the study of
products as they are – is different from the rhetoric of
products – the study of how products come to be as
vehicles of argument and persuasion about the
desirable qualities of private and public life.” From this
perspective, design history, theory, and criticism should
balance any discussion of products with the particular
conceptions that stand behind the product in its
historical context.
The characteristic indeterminacy of subject matter
makes design a discipline fundamentally concerned
with matters that admit alternative resolutions;
solutions and understandings that are created rather
than discovered. Designers deal with matters of choice
– with things that may be other than they are – and the
essential nature of design calls for both the process and
the results of designing to be open to debate and
disagreement. Designers deal with possible worlds and
with opinions about what the human environment
should be, and any design decision is open to
questioning and debate.
Buchanan describes all making as an integrative,
synthetic activity, and with reference to Aristotle he
stresses the importance of distinguishing the element of
forethought from the specific considerations and

activities relevant to each kind of making. “Forethought
is an ‘architectonic’ or ‘master’ art, concerned with
discovery and invention, argument and planning, and the
purposes or ends that guide the activities of the
subordinate arts and crafts.” (Buchanan 1995:31) The
element of forethought in making is what subsequently
came to be known as design. Already in the ancient
world, the core art of rhetoric served as a basis for
systematic forethought in the forms of making in words,
providing the organization of thought in narrative and
argument as well as the composition and arrangement of
words in style.
Rhetoric has exerted powerful influences on arts of
making in other materials than words, and has often
provided a way of connecting ethics, politics, and the
theoretical sciences with the activities of making.
Buchanan shows the complex relations between rhetoric
and making, and from the Renaissance, the practical arts
of making were distinguished from the fine arts as well
as from the theoretical sciences and rhetoric. Design,
separated from making as well as the intellectual and fine
arts, were in many ways left without an intellectual
foundation of its own. “Therefore, instead of becoming a
unifying discipline directed toward the new productive
capabilities and scientific understanding of the modern
world, design diminished in importance and fragmented
into the specializations of different types of production,
leaving its connection with other human enterprises and
bodies of knowledge vague and uncertain.” (Buchanan
1995:34)
Buchanan points at the similarities between the problems
identified by Herbert Simon and problems discussed by
Aristotle. He sees Simon’s proposed solution of a science
of design as having features that are both rhetorical – an
emphasis on deliberation and decision making – and
poetic, in the sense that all human made products could
be analysed and understood from the activity of making.
A science of the artificial could be seen as interested in
the elements of forethought – and thereby the rhetoric –
operating behind all arts of making.
The themes of rhetoric have, according to Buchanan,
during the last century emerged in design because they
provide the integrative connections that are needed in an
age of technology. The pattern of rhetoric in recent
design builds upon distinctions which were established in
rhetorical theory and developed to meet changing
circumstances. The traditional divisions of rhetoric are
by Buchanan described as invention, judgement,
disposition (planning the sequence of argument), delivery
(choosing the appropriate vehicle for presenting

arguments to different audiences) , and expression
(choosing the appropriate stylistic embodiment of
arguments).
Design has become an art of deliberation essential for
making in all phases of human activity. It applies to
making of theories which attempt to explain the natural
operations of the world, just as much as it applies to
making policies and institutions, and the making of
objects. “Deliberation in design yields arguments: the
plans, proposals, sketches, models, and prototypes
which are presented by designers as the basis for
understanding, practical action, or production. Design
is the art of shaping arguments about the artificial or
human-made world, arguments which may be carried
forward in the concrete activities of production in each
of theses areas, with objective results ultimately judged
by individuals, groups, and society.” (Buchanan
1995:46)
Here rhetoric and design – as well as the rhetoric of
design – can be important means to produce
knowledge, especially by further developing the
architectural and design disciplines in relation to the
notions brought forth by doxology.

DESIGN AND RESEARCH
Design, and especially architectural design, has
possibilities to become a more conscious tool for
thought other than merely be for the production of
products and buildings. Sanford Kwinter has argued
that architecture no longer is the usual devotion to
objects, but is becoming an organon, that is a means to
gain knowledge, a system of inquiry, innovation and
technique. (Kwinter 1998) The produced formations of
architectural projects, the assemblages of matter,
discourses and functions, could be objects of
knowledge. Architectural design as a practice of
formation, of material organisation, of giving form to
elusive and contradictory forces of the project
embedded in a complex society has a great capacity to
produce knowledge. As Peter Downton writes: “Once
in the world of things and ideas, a design can be seen as
a repository of knowledge and interrogated to reveal
the knowledge its designers have both intentionally and
unintentionally embodied there.” (Downton 2003) The
realised material form could inform us about the
conditions and governing forces producing them.
Sanford Kwinter has also argued for what he calls an
extended “true formalism” instead of the “poor
formalisms” that are limited by a conflation of the
notion of “form” with that of “object”. The problems of

form are, according to Kwinter, rather about the
mechanisms of formation, about processes in which
discernable patterns are emerging out of a less finelyordered field. Form is in this perspective ordering action,
a logic deployed while the object is merely a resulting
image of that process. Kwinter writes that true formalism
refers to any method that diagrams the proliferation of
fundamental resonances between the form of the object
(or the form of expression) and the form of the content
that produces the object, and demonstrates how these
accumulate into figures of order and shape. In a line of
arguments that seems to owe a lot to Foucault, Kwinter
argues that true formalism offers the possibility for “a
pragmatic description of historical emergence (why this
object, institution or configuration here, in this place, at
this time, and not that?)”. (Foucault 1972; Kwinter 2003)
Formalism in Kwinters view demonstrates that form is
resonance and expression of embedded forces, and the
best local formalisms show that these embedded forces
are themselves organised and have a pre-concrete, logical
form of their own. It is about peering into the object
towards its rules of formation and the dynamic relation
between these two levels of form. The manifest form that
appears is the result of a computational interaction
between internal rules and external pressures that,
themselves, originate in other adjacent forms, according
to Kwinter. But I would argue that many of the forces of
the external (as well as internal) pressures are more of a
diagrammatic, formless kind, that the forming action of
the architectural project actually gives form to them as
well, and thereby presents a possibility for knowledge
about them. This formalism of Kwinters also have
connections to or could be further developed in relation
to rhetoric and a doxological view of knowledge.
Design and architecture as knowledge producing
activities can be of many kinds. It can be done by using a
repertoire of historically known solutions and apply them
in a context so patterns emerge more clearly or that these
solutions give rise to new functions and new ways of
looking at situations. It can be by using architectural
tools and imagination to grasp and freeze conditions,
influencing factors, demands and dreams in a specific
situation and give it visual, material form that can be a
point of departure for understanding and gaining
knowledge about the situation and the included elements.
Designs and proposals can, as doxology, be a way of
showing prevailing relations, norms, values, and truths in
specific situation. Thereby can also unexpected solutions
be shown, surprising possibilities that where not thought
of before, that where “impossible”, maybe
“unacceptable” within the current doxa, before they

where given a form and presented. Here design
thinking and new doxological notions of knowledge
can give new ways of producing knowledge.
Since a couple of years the discussions in science
theory is expanding its scope to incorporate or make
use of other ways of working, where a design attitude,
practice and contexts of application have come to be in
a focus of interest. (Gibbons et al. 1994) Here
architecture, with its ramifications into, its bringing
together (and many times dependence) of different
disciplines, could be a palpable field for production of
knowledge about the realities and societies that are
dealt with. But an active work is of course needed to
show, articulate and develop new ways to produce
knowledge in a field and profession that often appears
as vague regarding what knowledge that is possessed
and contributed. (Nilsson 2004) There is anyhow a
chance to turn the work with vague, anexact concepts
in problematic, elusive situations characteristic for
architecture and design disciplines, into an asset of
tools and trained abilities to deal with complexity,
chaos and change. A further development of design
disciplines based on rhetoric and doxology is here of
great importance for making design thinking important
in knowledge production.
Science and production of knowledge have always a
difficult tightrope to walk. There is a need for inner
consistency, adaptation to the inner demands
concerning what is regarded as science, and a certain
distance to the objects of study. At the same time, there
is a need for an openness to the outer world one is
striving to explain and understand, where really
descending into reality or pull in new things, notions,
changed material and social conditions can lead to the
opening of new ways for productions of knowledge.
Here are constantly two poles of on the one hand
systematisation, limitation, drawing of borders, and on
the other messiness, liberation, transgression. We need
them both when trying to understand the chaotic reality,
and constructing a graspable world – a world of things,
societies, truths, and knowledges, that is created, and
designed, by ourselves.
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